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Abstract
Most monetary policy committees decide on interest rates using
a simple majority voting rule. Given the inherent heterogeneity of
committee members, this voting rule is suboptimal in terms of the
quality of the interest rate decision, but popular for other (political)
reasons. We show that a clustering of committee members into 2
subgroups, as is the case in a hub-and spokes systems of central banks
such as the Fed or the ESCB, can eliminate this suboptimality whilst
retaining the majority voting rule.
JEL codes: D71, D78, E58
Key words: central banks’ policies, decision-making under uncer-
tainty, committees, decision-making processes
1 Introduction
”...Improving the quality of decision-making by eliminating
certain sources of error that prevent a group from achieving its
goals can be expected to have good social consequences for policy-
making groups that have good goals...”1
¤De Nederlandsche Bank and Tinbergen Institute, the Netherlands.
yDe Nederlandsche Bank, Erasmus University Rotterdam and Tinbergen Institute, the
Netherlands. Corresponding author. E-mail: B.K.Bierut@dnb.nl.
zThe authors thank Otto Swank, Job Swank, Bauke Visser, Bryan Chapple, Robert
Paul Berben and seminar participants at DNB and the Western Economic Association for
their invaluable help. The views expressed are those of the authors and need not represent
the ones of the institutions a¢liated.
1Janis (1982), p. 274
1
Most textbooks on monetary policy are based, either implicitly or ex-
plicitly, on the assumption that policy decisions are taken by a homogenous
entity, often denoted by ‘the’ central bank. However, in reality these deci-
sions are the competence of a group of persons, organized in the form of a
committee. Prominent examples include the Federal Open Market Commit-
tee (FOMC) of the Federal Reserve System and the Governing Council of the
European Central Bank (ECB). As noted by, inter alia, Blinder (1998) and
Chappell et al. (2003), the fact that monetary decision-making is conducted
by a committee could have implications for the way policy is conducted.
In this paper we focus on issues stemming from the unavoidable hetero-
geneity among committee members, in particular the heterogeneity in the
accuracy with which they are able to correctly judge the prevailing (eco-
nomic) conditions, and therefore their ability to take the (ex ante) correct
interest rate decision. Intuitively, one would like to have more-skilled com-
mittee members to have a larger say in the collective decision. Indeed, it can
be shown (see Ben-Yashar and Nitzan, 1997) that a weighted voting rule is
optimal in terms of the quality of the collective decision. Although weighted
voting rules can be found in real life2, it is seldom found in monetary policy
committees. This may be due to the fact that it is politically infeasible (as
it could be seen as running counter to democratic principles), or di¢cult to
implement in practice. It would for example require the ex ante precise quan-
ti…cation of expertise, and it would require constant adjustments according
to the evolution of individual expertise.
The main contribution of this paper is that we show that a certain in-
stitutional setup of a committee is able to both retain the simple majority
voting rule3 and to eliminate the ine¢cient use of information implied by the
fact that individual members have di¤erent levels of expertise. We propose
to divide the committee into two sub-groups according to skills of members,
allow the more-skilled group to meet prior to the actual policy meeting and
be allowed to produce a consensual position regarding the appropriate stance
of monetary policy. Subsequently, the two groups should jointly take a vote
on interest rates. In addition to an e¢cient use of the available information,
our solution has additional advantages, as it combines several prescriptions
suggested by Irving Janis to prevent a detrimental concurrence-seeking group
2Prominent examples include decision-making in the Council of the European Union
and the presidential elections in the United States. In both cases, votes are weighted
according to size of the region in question.
3Simple majority as we use throughout the text has 2 de…ning characteristics: the
principle of one person one vote, and the majority of 50% +1 votes is required to adopt a
certain decision.
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dynamics, labelled as groupthink.4 The relevance of our proposal becomes
clear once one looks at two of the most in‡uential central banks in the world,
i.e. the Federal Reserve System in the US and the European System of Cen-
tral Banks in Europe (more speci…cally, in the euro area). Both central banks
have two-tier monetary policy committees, which is related to the structure
of the corresponding central bank, characterized by a main o¢ce in central
location with additional regional o¢ces throughout the currency area. We la-
bel this as a ’hub-and-spokes’ system. As a consequence, the FOMC consists
of the members of the Board of Governors (hub) as well as the presidents of
the Federal Reserve Banks (spokes). The Governing Council of the European
Central Bank includes members of the Executive Board of the ECB (’hub’)
as well as governors of all euro area national central banks (’spokes’). If,
for whatever reason, members of the Board of Governors (ECB Executive
Board) are in a better position to identify the ’true’ state of the economy
from the evidence presented then are other members of the FOMC (Gov-
erning Council), our analysis indicates that the adopted structure actually
improves the quality of monetary policy.
In the literature on monetary policy, modelling the behaviour of the cen-
tral bank has been predominantly along the lines of Barro and Gordon (1983)
and Rogo¤ (1985). Hefeker (2003) and Sibert (2003) constitute recent exam-
ples of the shift in research attention to the investigation of the behaviour of
individuals that together form a monetary policy committee. Our work dif-
fers from theirs in that we want to focus on the e¤ects of the decision rule on
the quality of monetary policy, and therefore sidestep the issue of di¤erences
in preferences of committee members. Given this objective, we also employ
a di¤erent methodology and use models of collective decision-making under
uncertainty, as frequently used in the jury literature. In fact, to our knowl-
edge, jury models are as yet not frequently used in the analysis of monetary
policy, which makes our paper interesting from the methodological point as
well. A prominent exception is the recent paper by Persico (2004). Although
related, this paper di¤ers in terms of objective, i.e. it focusses on the role of
information gathering.
Section 2 below describes the basic model and illustrates the suboptimal-
ity of simple majority voting in a monetary policy committee with heteroge-
nous members. Section 3 proposes an alternative, and explores the (rational-
ity of the) voting behaviour of members in this alternative regime. Section 4
presents the consequences of our alternative structure of the monetary pol-
icy committee for the quality of monetary policy, and section 5 concludes.
Proofs of propositions can be found in the appendix.
4Janis (1982)
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2 E¤ects of a sub-optimal decision rule
In a monetary policy committee, members are presented with evidence con-
cerning the state of the economy. Their interpretation of the evidence may
di¤er. Each member assesses the evidence, and on the basis of her interpre-
tation votes either to change the policy interest rate or to leave it unchanged.
In deciding how to vote, each member has to consider the costs of changing
interest rates when the economy in fact requires leaving them unchanged, or
of leaving the policy stance unchanged when the economy actually requires a
change in rates. The committee member must also consider the likely e¤ect
of her vote on the …nal outcome, which depends on the votes of other mem-
bers. Thus an answer to the question how a committee member will vote
requires considering the strategic interaction between committee members.
Decision-making in a monetary policy committee may therefore modelled us-
ing Bayesian game theory, see for example Osborne (2004) and Hirschleifer
and Riley (1992).
Our setup is a modi…cation of the seminal work of Austen-Smith and
Banks (1996) and Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) on juries.5 We inves-
tigate interest rate decision-making by a monetary policy committee faced
with uncertainty about the prevailing economic conditions. We model this
uncertainty by assuming that the economy can be in either of two states of the
world: in state a economic conditions require a change of the policy rate (de-
cision A ), in state b the appropriate decision (labelled decision B) is to keep
rates unchanged. We assume that committee members have identical prior
beliefs regarding the appropriate monetary policy stance, and do not have an
’intrinsic preference’ regarding monetary policy, i.e. we preclude ’doves’ or
’hawks’.6 Of course the (ex hypothesi equal) prior belief may and in general
will be modi…ed by the evidence on the state of the economy presented in
the meeting. We model the possibility that committee members interpret the
evidence di¤erently by assuming that this interpretation represents a private
signal each member receives and that is imperfectly correlated with the true
state of the economy. The higher the quality of this interpretation, the larger
the probability that the member receives the correct signal. This translates
5See Persico (2004) for a comprehensive overview of the related literature.
6This assumption, formalised by symmetric priors: 8i : Pi (a) = Pi (b) = 0:5, is com-
monly made in the jury literature. In contrast, most of the literature on monetary policy
commitees (see the Introduction) analyses the e¤ects of a prior bias, that moreover di¤ers
between committee members. In our defense, as the objective of the paper is to study the
e¤ects of a voting rule and committee structure on the quality of the collective outcome,
it seems appropriate not to attribute prior bias to individual members. For an analysis of
heterogenous priors, see Hao, Rosen and Suen (1999).
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directly into a higher probability of making the correct individual decision,
i.e. voting for a change in interest rates in state a and voting for unchanged
rates in state b:
Pi(vote Aja) = Pi(vote Bjb) = qi
Pi(vote Bja) = Pi(vote Ajb) = 1 ¡ qi
We label the qi’s as individual decisional skills. Suppose furthermore it is
possible to cluster committee members into 2 subgroups such that the average
skill level between both groups di¤er. In hub-and-spokes systems of central
banks such as in the US or the euro area, such a clustering might coincide
with the ’institutional’ clustering of the center versus the regions. We will
return to this issue later. We model this clustering as follows: m more-skilled
and n less-skilled individuals, such that individual skills qi are independently
drawn from the following (normal) distributions:7
8i 2 M : qi » N(qM ; qM (1¡ qM)m )
8i 2 N : qi » N(qN; qN (1 ¡ qN)n )
qM ¸ qN
8i : 0:5 · qi · 1
We furthermore assume that everybody knows in which group he or she
falls, and also in which group other committee members fall. The monetary
policy committee only convenes a single time, and decides only on interest
rates, via a simultaneous voting procedure.
Each committee member wishes to contribute to the appropriate mon-
etary policy, i.e. the interest rate setting that is called for by the state of
the economy. She is indi¤erent between changing rates or leaving them un-
changed, as long as the choice is appropriate given the economic situation.
Each committee member strictly prefers these two outcomes to one in which
interest rates are set inappropriately. Moreover, each member considers an
inappropriate change in interest rates as bad as inappropriately leaving the
policy stance unchanged. These preferences are represented by the following
Bernoulli payo¤s for each committee member:8
ui (Xjx) =
½
1 if X = B and x = b or if X = A and x = a
0 if X = A and x = b or if X = B and x = a
¾
(1)
7The important assumption here is that the distribution of individual skills has second
and higher moments that are negligible. This allows us to express the probability that
the collective decision is correct in terms of average decisional skills instead of individual
skills. Our choice of normal distribution follows the literature, see Grofman et al. (1983).
8This utility speci…cation implies that all committee members want to take the correct
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It is well-known (see e.g. Ben-Yashar and Nitzan, 1997) that, if commit-
tee members have asymmetric skills (and there is no clustering of members
into subgroups), the optimal decision rule is weighted majority, with higher
weights assigned to higher-skilled individuals. Weighted majority maximizes
the gains from aggregating individual expertise. However, in most real-life
situations, and in particular in monetary policy committees, the votes are
not weighted according to decisional skills. The decisions are taken by sim-
ple majority. It can be shown9 that under this voting rule it is rational for
the individual member to base her vote only on her interpretation of the
evidence regarding the state of the economy, i.e. to vote informatively. How-
ever, despite maximizing individual expected utility, informative voting is
not enough to prevent the accuracy of the collective decision from deterio-
rating under a suboptimal decision rule. This result is illustrated in …gure 1
below, which presents on the vertical axis the quality of the monetary pol-
icy decision (represented by the conditional probability that the committee
takes a correct decision, denoted by P ) under both simple majority10 (dotted
lines) and the optimal rule, i.e. weighted majority11 (solid lines). We assume
decision. However, they may have di¤erent opinions on what actually is the correct de-
cision, since they have di¤erent information and skills. This speci…cation, therefore, does
not imply that they all prefer the same interest rate.
9Because voting is simultaneous, the skill heterogeneity does not provide additional
information for individual members that is relevant for the collective decision. That is, we
can use the results of Austin-Smith and Banks (1996), derived under identical skills. The
intuition behind their rationality proof is straightforward: under a simple majority voting
rule, an individual vote is pivotal (i.e. can change the collective outcome) only when votes
of other committee members are equally divided. Such a situation does not provide any
additional information about the state of the economy, and an individual is left to trust
his or her private information. That is, she will vote for A (B) if a signal to that e¤ect is
received. See also Coughlan (2000).
10We can write the conditional probabilities as: PSM (B jb) = PSM (Aja) =
mP
sM=0
Ã¡ m
sM
¢
qsMM (1 ¡ qM )m¡sM
nP
s= n+m+12 ¡sM
¡n
s
¢
qsN (1 ¡ qN )n¡sN
!
.
11That is PFB(B jb) =
mP
sM=0
0@¡ m
sM
¢
qsMM (1 ¡ qM )m¡sM
nP
s= n2 +( m2 ¡sM)wMwN
¡n
s
¢
qsN (1 ¡ qN )n¡sN
1A
= P FB(Aja), where wM = ln qM1¡qM and wN = ln qN1¡qN denote the optimal weights to be
attributed to the votes of more- and less-skilled individuals (see also proof to proposition
1 in the appendix). F B refers to the …rst best decision rule, i.e. weighted majority.
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qM = 0:8 ¸ qN , m = 6, n = 3 (thin lines) or n = 13 (thicker lines).
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Figure 1.  The accuracy of the collective interest rate decision 
(Simple and weighted majority)
Compared to the optimal outcome, the loss in accuracy of the interest rate
decision can be quite substantial, especially if the skills are very asymmetric
within the committee and/or if the lower-skilled group dominates the com-
mittee in size. In the following section we will investigate possible solutions
to this problem.
3 Individual voting behaviour
Our main result, to be stated more precisely below, is that the above-
mentioned informational ine¢ciency can be resolved by allowing the sub-
group that is better in interpreting the available economic evidence (i.e. the
subgroup characterized by a higher average skill level) to meet prior to the
full committee meeting and allow them to take a collective stand regarding
the appropriate interest rate action. We assume that both the subgroup and
the full committee decide using a simple majority voting rule,12 and that both
decisions are made by a simultaneous vote. We start by assuming that the
common position of the subgroup (if any, see below) is not disclosed prior
to the vote in the full committee. We subsequently relax this assumption,
allowing for communication.
12The assumption of simple majority voting in the full committee obviously is essential.
The same does not apply for the subgroup, we use the assumption kM = m2 + 1 mainly
for reasons of simplicity.
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As the formal monetary policy decision has to be taken by the full com-
mittee, the subgroup has the option to decide ’not to decide’. The meeting
of the subgroup thus can generate three outcomes, depending on the distri-
bution of opinions among the subgroup members. If there is a majority in
favour of either A or B, this majority view is adopted. If not, no prior posi-
tion is adopted and the subgroup members will vote individually in the full
committee.13 We formalize the outcome of the subgroup meeting in terms of
probabilities that a certain alternative is selected, conditional on the avail-
able information on the state of the economy. The three possible outcomes:
(1) consensus for a correct decision (e.g. status quo in state b: P (CBjb)), (2)
consensus for an incorrect decision (e.g. a change in interest rates in state b:
P (CAjb)), and (3) no consensus (i.e. P (NCjb)) are given by:
P (CBjb) = P (CAja) = P
SM½M
sM¸m2 +1
Q
i2SM
qi
Q
i=2SM
(1 ¡ qi) (2)
P (CAjb) = P (CBja) = P
SM½M
sM¸m2 +1
Q
i2SM
(1¡ qi) Q
i=2SM
qi (3)
P (NCjb) = P (NCja) = 1¡ P (CBjb) ¡ P (CAjb) (4)
where the sums are taken over all subsets SM of the set M = f1; 2; 3; :::;mg,
such that sM (the number of members in SM) is at least m2 + 1. Under the
assumptions made in the previous section, we can write conditional proba-
bilities of the subgroup taking either of the three actions as:
P (CBjb) = P (CAja) = mP
sM=m2 +1
¡ m
sM
¢
qsMM (1 ¡ qM)m¡sM (5)
P (CAjb) = P (CBja) = mP
sM=m2 +1
¡ m
sM
¢
qm¡sMM (1¡ qM)sM (6)
P (NCjb) = P (NC ja) = ¡mm
2
¢
q
m
2
M (1¡ qM)
m
2 (7)
The outcome of the subgroup meeting obviously has consequences for the
number of other committee members that have to be in favour of each policy
alternative in order to get it passed in the full committee. If opinions in
the subgroup are divided, one half of the subgroup members will vote for
one alternative and the other half will vote against. If the subgroup has a
common position which in fact is the incorrect policy option, then the full
committee can still take the correct decision, if n+m+12 out of n less-skilled
13See Meade and Sheets (2002) for indications of dissenting behaviour within monetary
policy committees of actual central banks.
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members vote for it. If the subgroup has voted in favour of the correct
alternative, then only n+m+12 ¡m less-skilled committee members have to be
of the same opinion and the correct decision will be passed.
The quality of the monetary policy decision in our two-tier setup is then
represented by the conditional probability that the monetary policy commit-
tee takes the correct decision:
P (Bjb) = P (B \ CBjb) + P (B \ CAjb) + P (B \ NCjb) (8)
where:
P (B \ CBjb) = P (CBjb) P
S½N
s¸n+m+12 ¡m
Q
i2S
qi
Q
i=2S
(1¡ qi) (9)
P (B \ CAjb) = P (CAjb) P
S½N
s¸n+m+12
Q
i2S
qi
Q
i =2S
(1¡ qi) (10)
P (B \ NCjb) = P (NCjb) P
S½N¡M
s¸n+12
Q
i2S
qi
Q
i=2S
(1¡ qi) (11)
S denotes subsets of the set N of less-skilled committee members, whose
number s is large enough to obtain the committee majority for the correct
decision. All conditional probabilities can be expressed using average de-
cisional skills of committee members, qM and qN , analogously to formulas
(5)-(7) for the subgroup.
Equations (8)-(11) characterize the decision on interest rates by the mon-
etary policy committee, assuming that individual members base their vote
on their interpretation of the evidence on the state of the economy. This
assumed voting behaviour (i.e. voting informatively) actually constitutes a
Nash equilibrium in the two-tier voting game, as we now show.
Each committee member i chooses a voting strategy that maximizes her
expected utility, calculated over all states of the world as well as the actions
chosen by other members (since they a¤ect the collective outcome and there-
fore utility of i).14 The latter complicates the analysis. In particular, there
are two types of situations that may occur: (1) votes of other committee
members will be divided in such a way that one of the alternatives will re-
ceive at least the required majority (in our case of simple majority: n+m+12
or more votes), and (2) votes of other committee members will be divided
in an indecisive way (in our case: n+m¡12 votes for decision A and
n+m¡1
2 for
decision B). In the former cases, the action (i.e. the vote) of individual i is
immaterial for the collective outcome and therefore for her expected utility
14See Osbourne (2004) for a further discussion of Bayesian games.
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(see equation 1). In the latter cases, the vote of individual i changes the col-
lective outcome (i.e. is pivotal) and therefore a¤ects directly her utility from
the collective decision. This implies that an utility maximizing committee
member i will restrict her voting strategy to the cases when her vote matters.
The optimal voting strategy of a rational committee member is to vote for
the alternative that is more likely to be correct, based on her information
set.15 The latter consists of her own signal and the information deduced from
the fact that her vote is pivotal.16 Informative voting constitutes a rational
choice if the following conditions are met:17
Pi2N (bjB;pivotal) ¸ 0:5 (12)
Pi2N (ajA;pivotal) ¸ 0:5 (13)
where
Pi2N (bjB;pivotal) = Pi(b)qiPi2N(pivotaljb)Pi(b)qiPi2N(pivotaljb)+Pi(a)(1¡qi)Pi2N(pivotalja) (14)
Pi2N (ajA;pivotal) = Pi (a)qiPi2N(pivotalja)Pi(a)qiPi2N (pivotalja)+Pi(b)(1¡qi)Pi2N(pivotaljb) (15)
Furthermore, informative voting constitutes a Nash equilibrium if the condi-
tions (12)-(13) hold when the probabilities are evaluated under the assump-
tion that all (other) committee members vote informatively.
Analyzing the game backwards, we start with the choice facing a less-
skilled member when she is to cast a vote for or against a change in interest
rates: her vote is pivotal when the votes of other committee members are
15 If we denote ri = P (bj information set), then the expected utility from voting B is
P (B) ri and the expected utility from voting A is P (A) (1 ¡ ri). An individual will vote
A if P (a) (1 ¡ ri) > P (b) ri, or (given the assumption of P (a) = P (b) = 0:5), if ri < 0:5.
16The informational content of the fact that i is pivotal is determined by the voting rule.
In the case of simple majority, being pivotal does not provide additional information. This
is not true for the case of unanimity. Assuming that no change in interest rates is the
default option and the change requires unanimity, the only situation when an individual
vote will be pivotal is when all other committee members will have voted for a change in
interest rates. In that case, and assuming that all other committee members have voted
informatively, state A is more likely to be true than state B and therefore option A is
more likely to be the correct decision.
17As discussed in the previous footnote, in the case of a unanimous voting rule these
conditions are not likely to be met. Pure considerations of a pivotal situation will lead
committee member i to believe that state A is more likely to be true and to vote for a
change in interest rates, regardless of her own information. In such a setup, informative
voting is not a Nash equilibrium: the best response to informative voting of other com-
mittee members is to vote uninformatively (!). For a more detailed analysis of the e¤ects
of unanimous voting rules, see Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998), Coughlan (2000) and
Gerardi (2000).
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split: n+m¡12 votes for a change and
n+m¡1
2 votes against. Such a situation
occurs in three cases, depending on the earlier decision of the more-skilled
subgroup (see equations (8)-(11)). Since the decision rules both in the sub-
group and in the full committee are symmetric, the probability of being
pivotal if all other members vote informatively is the same in both states of
the world, and is given by:
Pi2N (pivotaljb) = Pi2N (pivotalja) = Pi2N (pivotal)
= P (CBjb)¡ n¡1n+m¡1
2 ¡m
¢ ³
q
n+m¡1
2 ¡m
N (1 ¡ qN)
n+m¡1
2
´
+P (CAjb)¡ n¡1n+m¡1
2
¢ ³
q
n+m¡1
2
N (1¡ qN)
n+m¡1
2 ¡m
´
+P (NC jb)¡n¡1n¡1
2
¢
q
n¡1
2
N (1¡ qN)
n¡1
2 (16)
Given this result and our assumption about the priors, we arrive at the
following simpli…cation of conditions (12)-(13):
Pi2N (bjB;pivotal) = Pi2N (ajA;pivotal) = qi2N (17)
By assumption qi2N ¸ 0:5 and therefore the optimal strategy for any less-
skilled member is to vote informatively if all other committee members are
assumed to vote informatively as well.
We now turn to the choices of the relatively higher skilled members.
Under our assumptions, an individual subgroup member’s vote is pivotal for
the interest rate decision to be taken in the full committee in m cases. In
these cases, her vote makes the di¤erence between adopting a common group
position or not, while the votes of other committee members are split in such
a way that a common position of the subgroup wins if it is adopted and
the other alternative wins if no common position is adopted.18 This requires
the following combination of votes: m2 votes for B in the more-skilled group
and between n¡12 and
n¡m+1
2 votes (thus
m
2 possible cases) for B among
less-skilled committee members19 or (symmetrically) m2 votes for A in the
more-skilled group and between n¡12 and
n¡m+1
2 votes (again
m
2 cases) for
A among other committee members. The table below illustrates this for a
6-person subgroup where a member is pivotal for the …nal decision (to be
18Alternatively, a subgroup member that has the swing vote in the subgroup can be
pivotal in the full committee as due to her swing vote, the outcome of the vote in the full
committee changes.
19That implies m2 ¡ 1 votes for A in the sub-group and between n+12 and n+m¡12 among
other committee members.
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taken by simple majority n+72 ):
20
Case Votes for B Votes for A
Sub-group 3 2
1 Other members n¡12
n+1
2
i votes B n¡12 + 6 =
n+11
2
n+1
2
i votes A n¡12 + 3 =
n¡5
2
n+1
2 + 3 =
n+7
2
2 Other members n¡32
n+3
2
i votes B n¡32 + 6 =
n+9
2
n+3
2
i votes A n¡32 + 3 =
n+3
2
n+3
2 + 3 =
n+9
2
3 Other members n¡52
n+5
2
i votes B n¡52 + 6 =
n+7
2
n+5
2
i votes A n¡52 + 3 =
n¡1
2
n+5
2 +3 =
n+11
2
Case Votes for B Votes for A
Sub-group 2 3
4 Other members n+12
n¡1
2
i votes B n+12 + 3 =
n+7
2
n¡1
2 +3 =
n+5
2
i votes A n+12
n¡1
2 +6 =
n+11
2
5 Other members n+32
n¡3
2
i votes B n+32 + 3 =
n+9
2
n¡3
2 +3 =
n+3
2
i votes A n+32
n¡3
2 + 6 =
n+9
2
6 Other members n+52
n¡5
2
i votes B n+52 + 3 =
n+11
2
n¡5
2 +3 =
n¡1
2
i votes A n+52
n¡5
2 + 6 =
n+7
2
The corresponding probabilities that a member of the more-skilled subgroup
20The squares highlight the winning majority. It is therefore easy to see, that depending
on i voting A or B , the winning alternative changes (i.e. i is indeed pivotal).
12
is pivotal for the interest rate decision are:
Pi2M (pivotalja) =
µ
m ¡ 1
m
2
¶
(1¡ qM)m2 q
m
2 ¡1
M
n¡1
2X
x=n¡m+12
µ
n
x
¶
(1¡ qN)n¡x qxN
+
µ
m ¡ 1
m
2 ¡ 1
¶
(1¡ qM)m2 ¡1 q
m
2
M
n+m¡1
2X
x= n+12
µ
n
x
¶
(1¡ qN)n¡x qxN (18)
and
Pi2M (pivotaljb) =
µ
m ¡ 1
m
2
¶
q
m
2
M (1¡ qM)
m
2 ¡1
n¡1
2X
x=n¡m+12
µ
n
x
¶
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Again we have the result:
Pi2M (pivotalja) = Pi2M (pivotaljb) = Pi2M (pivotal) (20)
and
Pi2M (bjB;pivotal) = Pi2M (ajA;pivotal) = qi2M (21)
Since qi2M ¸ 0:5 informative voting is rational for all more-skilled commit-
tee members, just as it is rational for all less-skilled committee members.
Hence, informative voting constitutes a Nash equilibrium in this two-tier
voting setup, provided that the interest rate decision is taken by simple ma-
jority.
4 The quality of monetary policy
The two-stage voting procedure de…ned above e¤ectively replaces the optimal
weighted voting rule as it reinforces the position of more-skilled committee
members. This result is stated in proposition 1 below.
Proposition 1 If individual decisional skills are highly heterogeneous, the
two-stage voting procedure described above perfectly approximates the accu-
racy of the collective decision that would be achieved in a committee domi-
nated by the subgroup if a weighted voting rule would be applied. The accuracy
of the collective decision taken by a committee where more-skilled members
are in minority is also improved but not as much.
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Proof. See appendix.
Figure 2 below illustrates proposition 1, using numerical assumptions
identical to the ones underlying …gure 1. Dotted lines refer to simple majority
without a two-tier setup, solid lines to weighted majority, and dashed lines
represent the quality of monetary policy formulated by a two-tier committee.
Thin lines represent a small committee (6 + 3 members) and thicker lines a
larger committee (6 + 13). The former is an illustration of a committee
dominated by the hub, as in the Federal Reserve, and the latter illustrates a
committee dominated by the spokes, as in the European Central Bank.
0.800
0.825
0.850
0.875
0.900
0.925
0.950
0.975
1.000
0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 q(N)
P
Weighted majority, n=3
Simple majority, n=3
2-stage voting, n=3
Weighted majority, n=13
Simple majority, n=13
2-stage voting, n=13
Figure 2.  The accuracy of the collective interest rate decision 
(Simple majority, weighted majority and two-stage voting)
Creating a subgroup of more-skilled members improves the accuracy of the
collective decision; this two-tier structure works particularly well in a rel-
atively small committee. Consider the FOMC in the United States. This
monetary policy committee, which is dominated (in terms of votes needed
to secure a majority) by the Board, decides using a simple majority rule.
The graph shows that if Board-FOMC members are substantially better in
assessing the available evidence on the state of the economy, simple majority
without allowing the Board to meet prior to the FOMC meeting and to take
a common stand on interest rates, is far from optimal. The degree of ine¢-
ciency is measured by the di¤erence between the thin solid and dotted lines.
This ine¢ciency is completely eliminated once prior meeting is allowed (the
thin solid and dashed lines overlap). For larger committees, this ine¢ciency
is reduced, but not eliminated. However, if we extend the two-tier structure
by allowing for communication prior to the decision in the full committee,
the quality of monetary policy again closely resembles the …rst best rule (of
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weighted voting). By communication we mean that the higher-skilled mem-
bers are required to announce their common position (if they have reached
one) before the interest rate vote in the full committee. This announcement
provides an additional common signal to other committee members.
Proposition 2 If individual decisional skills are highly heterogeneous, com-
munication in a two-stage voting procedure increases the accuracy of the col-
lective decision to be made by a committee where more-skilled members are
in minority so that it is as high as if a weighted voting rule were applied.
This is because communication changes the rational behavior of committee
members: the less-skilled individuals choose to follow the common position of
the more-skilled ones.
Proof. See appendix.
Again we illustrate the results from proposition 2 graphically in …gure 3
below: we reproduce the lines from …gure 2 drawn for the larger commit-
tee of 19 individuals and introduce a boxed line for the two-tier setup with
communication stage.
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Figure 3.  The accuracy of the collective interest rate decision 
(Simple majority, weighted majority and two-stage voting with and without communication)
Figure 3 illustrates the fact that communication yields the highest accu-
racy of the collective decision for the lowest average skills of the less-skilled
members.21 As we move to the right along the qN axis the optimal decision
21The boxed line is shorter than other lines, because the two-tier set-up with communi-
cation is ’double-sided’: it works very well if decisional skills are su¢ciently heterogeneous
between the two sub-committees, otherwise (see proposition 3 below) it performs badly.
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procedure changes from two-tier voting with communication, through two-
tier voting without communication, to simple majority voting. As a result
the …rst best decision rule is closely approximated for every level of qN . The
ECB Governing Council can be taken as a real-life example of a larger com-
mittee, where the Executive Board is in minority. The Governing Council
currently decides by simple majority. Only when Council members are nearly
identical in terms of their ability to assess the true state of the economy of
the euro area correctly from the available evidence will this voting rule imply
the highest possible quality of the monetary policy decision. If it is the case
that, say, the members of the Executive Board of the ECB are on average
better informed or for some other reason are better skilled in identifying the
true state of the economy, simple majority in the Council results in subopti-
mal monetary policy decisions, as it implies an ine¢cient use of information.
The extent of this ine¢ciency depends on the size of the ’skill bias’, as does
the solution for improving the quality of the monetary policy decision. If
governors of euro area national central banks on average are substantially
worse in interpreting the evidence on the state of the economy in the euro
area presented in the Council meeting, it would pay to allow the Board to
meet prior to the Council meeting to discuss interest rates and to communi-
cate the result of this meeting to the Council prior to the decision on interest
rates. If this skill bias is relatively small, it still pays to allow the Board
to meet prior to the Council meeting, but communication of the outcome of
this meeting should be discouraged.
In fact, a word of caution is necessary. Knowledge of the size of the
skill bias is essential, if one were to institutionally adjust the structure of
the monetary policy committee composed of heterogenous members as to
achieve the best possible monetary policy decision. A misjudgment regarding
the skill bias might lead to a committee structure that actually results in a
worse monetary policy outcome than the default of the committee taking the
decision by simple majority after a simultaneous vote. We can observe this
clearly in …gure 3: for qN larger than 0:69 the dotted line is drawn above
the dashed line, i.e. simple majority yields higher accuracy in collective
decision-making than the two-stage voting. As we show in proposition 3, an
institutional structure in which the Board meets prior to the Council and
communicates the outcome of this meeting to other Council members before
the vote on interest rates takes place can be especially damaging if members
are actually relatively homogenous in their decisional skills.
Proposition 3 If individual decisional skills are relatively homogeneous, com-
munication accentuates the adverse e¤ects that the two-stage decision-making
process has on the accuracy of the collective decision, as the rational choice of
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the ’less-skilled’ committee members is to vote against the consensual position
of the ’more-skilled’ ones.
Proof. See appendix.
5 Discussion
The key idea underlying the analysis presented above is that members of
monetary policy committees might di¤er systematically in their ability to
interpret the economic evidence presented to them in the committee meet-
ing. In hub-and-spokes central banks such as the FED or the ESCB, this
may coincide with the division between the hub and the spokes. The hub
(i.e. the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the ECB
Executive Board) is usually entrusted with the preparation of the monetary
policy discussions; for example, it prepares assessments of current macroeco-
nomic conditions and provides forecasts under alternative policy scenarios.
The execution of these tasks may require a knowledge base of the hub that
is, on average, higher than that of the spokes. Also, the hub usually acts as
liason between the currency area (the US or the euro area) and the outside
world, and thereby gets access to private information that makes it better
equipped to interpret the evidence on the state of the economy of the cur-
rency area (Chappell, Havrilesky and McGregor, 1993, 1995). Finally, it
has been argued (see Hefeker, 2003) that hub-and-spokes central banks, and
corresponding monetary policy committees, re‡ect a political compromise
between regions, which insist on representation, and a board appointed by
the central governing body. This may coincide with the hub being relatively
more informed regarding the currency area as a whole, with the spokes having
regional expertise.
So, in our view one cannot dismiss a priori the possibility that the there
is a skill bias between members of the hub and the spokes in monetary policy
committees similar in structure to those in the US and the euro area. This
paper indicates that, if such a bias is indeed present and substantial in size,
having a meeting of the full committee that decides on monetary policy by
simple majority will result in monetary policy that is suboptimal. When
implementing the optimal voting rule is either unwarranted (for democratic
or political reasons for example) or infeasible, our results indicate that it
is, in principle, possible to restructure the committee in such a way that it
generates monetary policy outcomes that closely approximate the optimum.
However, the solution we propose is not without its dangers, i.e. the
cure may actually be worse than the illness. This is especially true if there is
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substantial uncertainty regarding the extent of the skill bias between the hub
and the spokes. In combination with the fact that hub-and-spokes systems
of central banks tend to be motivated by more reasons than the quality
of policy, see for example von Hagen and Süppel (1994), and Meade and
Sheets (forthcoming), it may actually be preferable to strive for a maximal
dissemination of knowledge and information across the hub and the spokes,
as to prevent a skill bias from occurring.
We would like to conclude by stating that, while the main motivation of
this research is based on real life, i.e. the ’hub-and-spokes’ monetary pol-
icy committees of the Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank, our
analysis is highly stylized and contains some important caveats. This should
be kept in mind when interpreting our results. An example of such a caveat is
that our setup allows only for a limited and speci…c form of interaction among
members, reducing the scope for an exchange of arguments that would lead
to a change of position. As noted by others, see, for example, DNB (2000)
and Goodfriend (1999), this interaction, where a common vision on inter-
est rates evolves from an exchange of views based on economic analysis, is
an important characteristic of monetary policy decision making by real-life
committees. Further research is warranted on this topic, and we plan to take
this up in the future.
6 Appendix: Proofs to propositions
Proposition 1 If individual decisional skills are highly heterogeneous, the
two-stage voting procedure described above perfectly approximates the accu-
racy of the collective decision that would be achieved in a committee domi-
nated by the subgroup if a weighted voting rule would be applied. The accuracy
of the collective decision taken by a committee where more-skilled members
are in minority is also improved but not as much.
Proof. When individual decisional skills are heterogeneous, a weighted
voting rule is optimal in terms of the quality of the collective decision. The
weight should be calculated as wi = ln
³
qi
1¡qi
´
. It can be shown that the
weight calculated for the average skill level is a good (…rst-order) approxima-
tion of the average weight of votes of the members belonging to one of the
sub-groups within the committee:
Ei2M
³
ln
³
qi
1¡qi
´´
' Ei2M
³
ln
³
qM
1¡qM
´
+ 1qM (1¡qM )(qi ¡ qM)
´
= ln
³
qM
1¡qM
´
Ei2N
³
ln
³
qi
1¡qi
´´
' Ei2N
³
ln
³
qN
1¡qN
´
+ 1qN(1¡qN)(qi ¡ qN)
´
= ln
³
qN
1¡qN
´
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Therefore the votes of more-skilled committee members can be weighted with
the weight ln
³
qM
1¡qM
´
and the votes of less-skilled members with the weight
ln
³
qN
1¡qN
´
.
If the skills of committee members are relatively homogeneous, i.e. if
qN ! qM, then wN ¡! wM , and the weights can be normalized to unity.
In this case standard results obtained in the literature for symmetric skills
hold, i.e. the …rst best decision rule (FB) corresponds to simple majority
(SM) and any modi…cation to this rule results in inferior accuracy of the
collective decision, i.e. PSM(Bjb) = PFB(Bjb) and P (Bjb) · PSM(Bjb):
The departure from the …rst best therefore has the most pronounced ef-
fects on the voting outcomes when qN ! 0:5 (see …gure 1). In this case votes
of the less-skilled individuals should be ignored: wN = ln 0:51¡0:5 = 0. As a
result the decisions should actually be taken by the subgroup of more-skilled
members regardless of its size relative to the committee majority (provided
this subgroup reaches consensus). Therefore the probability that the com-
mittee takes the correct decision is given by:
PFB(Bjb)jqN!0:5 !
mP
sM=m2 +1
¡ m
sM
¢
qsMM (1¡ qM)m¡sM +0:5
¡m
m
2
¢
(qM (1¡ qM))m2
Simple majority decision rule on the other hand yields the following results:
PSM(Bjb)jqN!0:5 !
mP
sM=0
Ã¡ m
sM
¢
qsMM (1¡ qM)m¡sM
nP
s= n+m+12 ¡sM
¡n
s
¢
0:5n
!
whereas simple majority in our 2-tier set-up yields:
P (Bjb)jqN!0:5 !
m
2 ¡1P
sM=0
¡ m
sM
¢
qsMM (1 ¡ qM)m¡sM
nP
s=n+m+12
¡n
s
¢
0:5n
+0:5
¡m
m
2
¢
(qM (1 ¡ qM))m2
+
mP
sM=m2 +1
¡ m
sM
¢
qsMM (1¡ qM)m¡sM
nP
s=n+m+12 ¡m
¡n
s
¢
0:5n
It is obvious that if m > n¡1, i.e. if the subgroup dominates the committee,
the last probability can be simpli…ed to obtain:
P (Bjb)jqN!0:5
m>n¡1
! mP
sM=m2 +1
¡ m
sM
¢
qsMM (1 ¡ qM)m¡sM + 0:5
¡m
m
2
¢
(qM (1 ¡ qM))m2
= PFB(Bjb)jqN!0:5
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However, if the group of relatively highly-skilled individuals forms a minor-
ity in the committee, the accuracy achieved under both ’ordinary’ simple
majority and simple majority in our 2-tier set-up is inferior to the …rst best
decision rule:
PFB(Bjb)jqN!0:5 ¡ PSM(Bjb)jqN!0:5 =
= ¡
m
2 ¡1P
sM=0
Ã¡ m
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¢
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nP
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s
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¢
qsMM (1¡ qM)m¡sM
Ã
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s
¢
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¸ 0
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nP
s=n+m+12
¡n
s
¢
0:5n
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However, our 2-tier procedure still yields results superior to simple majority:
P (Bjb)jqN!0:5 ¡ PSM(Bjb)jqN!0:5 =
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s
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¢
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Proposition 2 If individual decisional skills are highly heterogeneous,
communication in a two-stage voting procedure increases the accuracy of the
collective decision to be made by a committee where more-skilled members
are in minority so that it is as high as if a weighted voting rule were applied.
This is because communication changes the rational behavior of committee
members: the less-skilled individuals choose to follow the common position of
the more-skilled ones.
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Proof. If communicated prior to the vote in the full committee, the
position on interest rates taken by the subgroup implies an additional piece of
information about the likely state of the economy for the less-skilled members.
Therefore individual voting behavior of the committee members changes:
Knowing that the more-skilled members have agreed on option B and
that she is pivotal, a less-skilled individual will vote informatively if and
only if the following conditions are met:
Pi2N (bjB;CB;pivotal) ¸ 0:5
Pi2N (ajA;CB;pivotal) ¸ 0:5
where
Pi2N (bjB;CB;pivotal) = qiP (CBjb)q
n+m¡1
2 ¡m
N (1¡qN)
n+m¡1
20BB@ qiP (CBjb)q
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n+m¡1
2
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2
N
1CCA
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2
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2
N (1¡ qN)
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N (1 ¡ qN)
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Since the setup is symmetric, the same conditions de…ne the optimal strat-
egy of a less-skilled individual in case the consensual position is A, since
Pi2N (bjB;CA;pivotal) = Pi2N (ajA;CB;pivotal) and Pi2N (ajA;CA;pivotal) =
Pi2N (bjB;CB;pivotal). In case no consensual position is presented, the re-
sults of Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) apply and the optimal strategy is
to vote informatively.
The conditions for the optimality of informative voting can be solved to
yield the following restrictions on the relationship between average skill levels
and sizes of the two subgroups:22µ
qN
1¡ qN
¶1¡m
·
Pm
sM=m2 +1
¡ m
sM
¢
qsMM (1¡ qM)m¡sMPm
sM=m2 +1
¡ m
sM
¢
qm¡sMM (1¡ qM)sM
> 1
µ
qN
1¡ qN
¶m+1
¸
Pm
sM=m2 +1
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sM
¢
qsMM (1¡ qM)m¡sMPm
sM=m2 +1
¡ m
sM
¢
qm¡sMM (1¡ qM)sM
> 1
It is obvious that these conditions are not necessarily simultaneously sat-
is…ed. First, for qN ! 0:5 (i.e. for highly heterogeneous skills), only the
22Assuming qi ! qN :
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…rst condition will be satis…ed, since
³
qN
1¡qN
´
jqN!0:5 ! 1. Secondly, if qN
increases (and approaches qM),
³
qN
1¡qN
´1¡m
quickly explodes (as can be seen
in the …gure below, where the expression
³
qN
1¡qN
´x
is drawn) and violation of
the …rst constraint becomes increasingly likely, while the second inequality
becomes easily satis…ed.
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We therefore observe that for highly heterogeneous skills, the second condi-
tion for the optimality of informative voting is likely to be violated. In this
case we have Pi2N (bjB;CB;pivotal) ¸ 0:5 and Pi2N (ajA;CB;pivotal) ·
0:5, and the optimal strategy for an individual i 2 N is to vote for B re-
gardless of her private information, i.e. to follow the common position of the
more-skilled members. Hence, informative voting is not the best response to
informative voting by other players, and it is not a Nash equilibrium.
In searching for a Nash equilibrium we …rst note that following the posi-
tion of the more-skilled members is the best response of a less-skilled indi-
vidual if other less-skilled members have chosen to follow as well. In such a
situation a less-skilled individual is never pivotal. Following the more-skilled
members trivially becomes her optimal voting strategy.
Although the optimal strategy of less-skilled members obviously changes
in response to the additional information, communication does not a¤ect
the strategy of more-skilled members, i.e. their optimal choice still is to
vote informatively. This is because an individual board member’s vote is
pivotal in the same (m) cases, when his vote makes the di¤erence between
a common position or no common position in the subgroup and the votes in
the full committee are split in such a way that in the case of no consensus in
the subgroup the other alternative wins. In order to illustrate the fact that a
more-skilled individual is pivotal in exactly the same cases as when there is
no communication, we construct a table analogous to the one in section 3.1
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with all cases when a member of a 6-person subgroup is pivotal for the …nal
decision when communication is involved:
Case Votes for B Votes for A
Sub-group 3 2
1 Other members n¡12
n+1
2
i votes B n + 6 0
i votes A n¡52
n+7
2
2 Other members n¡32
n+3
2
i votes B n + 6 0
i votes A n+32
n+9
2
3 Other members n¡52
n+5
2
i votes B n + 6 0
i votes A n¡12
n+11
2
Case Votes for B Votes for A
Sub-group 2 3
4 Other members n+12
n¡1
2
i votes B n+72
n+5
2
i votes A 0 n +6
5 Other members n+32
n¡3
2
i votes B n+92
n+3
2
i votes A 0 n +6
6 Other members n+52
n¡5
2
i votes B n+112
n¡1
2
i votes A 0 n +6
Comparison to the table in section 3.1. reveals that in all 6 cases the votes
of all committee members other than member i are split in exactly the same
way as when the communication stage is not included. As a result, the
conclusions about optimal voting strategy made in section 3.1 hold in the
setup enlarged by communication.
Therefore the equilibrium of the two-stage voting game with communi-
cation is: (1) informative voting of the more-skilled members and (2) infor-
mative voting/following the more-skilled members for the less-skilled indi-
viduals. As we have already indicated, this is an equilibrium if and only if
the skills are su¢ciently heterogeneous (the case of the less-than-su¢cient
heterogeneity will be dealt with in the next proposition).
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Under this new equilibrium behaviour, the probability that the committee
takes the correct decision is given by:
PCOM(Bjb)jqN!0:5 !
mP
sM=m2 +1
¡ m
sM
¢
qsMM (1 ¡ qM)m¡sM + 0:5
¡m
m
2
¢
q
m
2
M (1 ¡ qM)
m
2
= PFB(Bjb)jqN!0:5
Proposition 3 If individual decisional skills are relatively homogeneous,
communication accentuates the adverse e¤ects that the two-stage decision-
making process has on the accuracy of the collective decision, as the rational
choice of the ’less-skilled’ committee members is to vote against the consen-
sual position of the ’more-skilled’ ones.
Proof. Under the assumption of comparable average skills, i.e. qi !
qN ! qM, the condition Pi2N (bjB;CB;pivotal) ¸ 0:5 will be violated and
the condition Pi2N (ajA;CB;pivotal) ¸ 0:5 will hold (see the proof to propo-
sition 2). It is thus optimal for the ’less-skilled’ individuals to vote against
the consensual position of the ’more-skilled’ members, e.g. to vote A when
the other group collectively supports decision B. As in the case qN ! 0:5,
the optimal voting strategy of the ’more-skilled’ members remains una¤ected
by the subsequent communication. The table below again presents the cases
when a member of 6-person subgroup is pivotal for the …nal decision:
Case Votes for B Votes for A
Sub-group 3 2
1 Other members n+12
n¡1
2
i votes B 6 n
i votes A n+72
n+5
2
2 Other members n+32
n¡3
2
i votes B 6 n
i votes A n+92
n+3
2
3 Other members n+52
n¡5
2
i votes B 6 n
i votes A n+112
n+1
2
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Case Votes for B Votes for A
Sub-group 2 3
4 Other members n¡12
n+1
2
i votes B n+12
n+7
2
i votes A n 6
5 Other members n¡32
n+3
2
i votes B n+32
n+9
2
i votes A n 6
6 Other members n¡52
n+5
2
i votes B n+12
n+11
2
i votes A n 6
Under the new kind of optimal voting behaviour of the ’less-skilled’ commit-
tee members, the votes of all committee members other than member i are
split in a somewhat di¤erent way than before. Nevertheless, it still holds
that
Pi2M (pivotalja) = Pi2M (pivotaljb) = Pi2M (pivotal)
and hence
Pi2M (bjB;pivotal) = Pi2M (ajA;pivotal) = qi2M
As a result, the new equilibrium behaviour is for the ’more-skilled’ mem-
bers to vote informatively and for the ’less-skilled’ individuals to vote strate-
gically: against the common position of the ’more-skilled’ subgroup, should
one be presented. The probability that the committee takes the correct de-
cision is now given by:
PCOM(Bjb)jqN!qM =
mP
sM=m2 +1
¡ m
sM
¢
(1¡ qM)sM qm¡sMM
+
¡m
m
2
¢
q
m
2
M (1¡ qM)
m
2
nP
s=n+12
¡n
s
¢
qsM (1¡ qM)n¡s
Communication, therefore, does more damage to the collective decision-
making compared to our 2-tier set-up without communication, since P (Bjb)jqN!qM ¸
PCOM(Bjb)jqN!qM :
P (Bjb)jqN!qM ¡ PCOM(Bjb)jqN!qM !
+
mP
sM=m2 +1
¡ m
sM
¢
qsMM (1 ¡ qM)m¡sM
nP
s=n¡m+12
¡n
s
¢
qsM (1¡ qM)n¡s
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sM=m2 +1
¡ m
sM
¢
(1 ¡ qM)sM qm¡sMM
nP
s= n¡m+12
¡n
s
¢
(1¡ qM)s qn¡sM ¸ 0
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